Calitics responds and obfuscates on my earlier post on EFCA.  Ok, let's go through the process under EFCA again. We start with union organizers trying to get workers to sign cards, once they get 30% of the cards signed they can request an election -- i.e. they have the option of giving workers the option to voice their wishes in private. This option of benevolence exists up to 50% of cards signed. After 50% of cards signed, the workers lose the right to voice their wishes in private, and gain a union.

In order to sell EFCA unions, and their supporters, need everyone to believe that they will call for elections during that 30%-50% window.  As well covered here, they do not and they will not.  Instead they will go for the sure thing, and without the possibility of a secret ballot there is no safety net for workers.  And boy do they need one:

In this case, employers colluded with a union (as they are allowed to do) to unionize their shop through card-check, without giving workers a chance to choose via a secret ballot election.

But the workers, subjected to the card-check process, didn't like the harassment from union organizers. After the union succeeded, they demanded a secret ballot election and decertified the union. Said one woman who works at the plant: "Those of us who spoke against them were being threatened and we actually had to be escorted out to our cars."

Brian Wilson's wrap-up underscores the problem with the card-check procedure, and delineates clearly why it is not a good idea to use it every single time workers consider unionizing their shop.

[H]er larger point here is this: if there had not been card check, if there had been a secret ballot, nobody in the plant would have known how she voted and therefore she would have not been in a position of being threatened by her fellow employees.